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INTRODUCTION 
What would have happened if the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act (PPACA)1 really had authorized government “death pa-
nels”2 that would decide whether or not an elderly patient could get 
treatment?  Leaving aside the Commerce Clause and other constraints 
particular to Congress, would that kind of direct health care rationing 
be a constitutional exercise of governmental power in the United 
States?  I think not.  I argue here that an emergent substantive due 
process constraint would invalidate such an exercise; the phantom 
death panels would violate a constitutional “freedom of health” that is 
nascent in Supreme Court precedent.  Based on that logic, I argue 
further that the substantive due process analysis of PPACA’s “individ-
ual mandate”—the requirement that all Americans carry health insur-
ance—may be more complicated than most scholars have recognized.  
The existence of a freedom of health implies that we cannot merely 
dismiss substantive due process challenges to the mandate on the 
ground that Lochner is dead.3 
Particularly since 2006, when a three-judge panel of the D.C. Cir-
cuit recognized a fundamental liberty interest in obtaining experi-
 
1 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
2 See Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, Getting to the Source of the ‘Death Panel’ Rumor, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at A1 (detailing the political creation of administrative-
euthanasia-panel rumors and their lack of basis in the reform bill itself); see also A Look 
at Claims About Health-Care Overhaul—Close Up, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at A3 
(debunking Governor Palin’s and other health care bill critics’ view that the bill would 
create “death panels”). 
3 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down a state regulation 
of the hours of bakery employees as an unconstitutional infringement on the substan-
tive due process right to freedom of contract), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Par-
rish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase 
Health Insurance, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT S2) 38, 45 (2009) (ar-
guing that the mandate implicates only economic interests and therefore, given the 
death of the Lochner era, implicates no modern substantive due process right). 
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mental drugs (later overturned en banc),4 health law scholars have 
debated the usefulness and propriety of protecting individuals’ liberty 
in medical decisionmaking.5  Unlike the international “human right 
to health,” this American “freedom of health” would operate primarily 
as a restriction on—rather than as an obligation for—governmental 
regulation of medical decisionmaking.6  That is, in the somewhat dis-
puted parlance of constitutional law, the right would be a negative 
 
4 See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach 
(Abigail Alliance I), 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that a terminally ill, 
mentally competent patient has a protected liberty interest in accessing potentially life-
saving investigational new drugs deemed safe enough for expanded human trial), rev’d 
en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
5 See B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & 
L. 501, 537-39 (2009) [hereinafter Hill, Reproductive Rights] (urging reproductive rights 
advocates to ground the abortion right in a constitutional freedom of health); B. Jessie 
Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions:  A Tale of Two Doctrines, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 324-28 (2007) [hereinafter Hill, Tale of Two Doctrines] (outlining 
the Supreme Court’s treatment of the individual freedom of health and the state in-
terest in regulating health as separate doctrines and tracing them through Supreme 
Court jurisprudence); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Public’s Right to Health:  When Pa-
tient Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335, 1386-88 (2009) (arguing 
that there should not be an individual freedom of health on the ground that such a 
freedom would endanger public health); John A. Robertson, Controversial Medical 
Treatment and the Right to Health Care, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 15, 16 
[hereinafter Robertson, Controversial Medical Treatment] (providing legal and historical 
foundations for a constitutional freedom of health that could be applied in Abigail Al-
liance); John A. Robertson, Embryo Culture and the “Culture of Life”:  Constitutional Issues 
in the Embryonic Stem Cell Debate, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 32-37 [hereinafter Robertson, 
Embryo Culture] (arguing that the constitutional freedom of health should prohibit re-
strictions on embryonic stem cell research); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohi-
bited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1815-17 
(2007) (basing the freedom of health in a right of self-defense).  At least one scholar 
considered and elaborated this possibility before Abigail Alliance was decided.  See Eliz-
abeth G. Patterson, Health Care Choice and the Constitution:  Reconciling Privacy and Public 
Health, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 22-28 (1989) (evaluating Supreme Court precedent on 
the right to refuse proffered care).  
6 See Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 503 (explaining the difference be-
tween positive and negative rights and arguing for a “negative right to health” that 
would “be understood as a right against government interference in health care access 
and medical decisionmaking, rather than a right to government-provided medical ser-
vices”); Hill, Tale of Two Doctrines, supra note 5, at 330 n.277 (same); Robertson, Contro-
versial Medical Treatment, supra note 5, at 15 (distinguishing “positive rights to state-
funded resources” from the right asserted in Abigail Alliance and characterizing the Ab-
igail Alliance right as a “negative right to health care” that would protect “the right of a 
patient and doctor to pursue a course of treatment of their choosing without interfe-
rence by the government”); Robertson, Embryo Culture, supra note 5, at 7-8 (arguing for 
a “negative right against governmental interference with therapy . . . not a positive 
right to state resources”). 
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one rather than a positive one,7 protected alongside other negative  
liberties under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of substantive 
due process.8 
As a handful of scholars have already pointed out, there is support 
in Supreme Court precedent for this kind of constitutional freedom 
of health.9  Particularly in its forced treatment, right to die, and re-
productive rights cases, the Supreme Court has hinted that the consti-
tutional right to bodily integrity includes both a freedom to reject un-
wanted medical intervention10 and a freedom to obtain certain health 
care goods and services.11  In other words, the Supreme Court has 
hinted that Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” includes individual au-
tonomy in health care decisionmaking. 
Both the existence and the strength of the Supreme Court’s free-
dom of health, however, are subject to ongoing debate.  We know, at a 
minimum, that the Supreme Court’s hints convinced two D.C. Circuit 
judges to recognize the health care liberty interest, to treat it as “fun-
damental,” and to apply it to invalidate longstanding administrative 
processes for drug approval.12  But we also know that litigants asserting 
the freedom of health in American courts have not always succeeded.13  
 
7 See generally ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty (drawing out and discussing the 
difference between positive and negative rights), in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122-
34 (1969).  For a succinct modern legal discussion of the distinction and its limitations, 
see Richard A. Posner, The Cost of Rights:  Implications for Central and Eastern Europe—and 
for the United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 2-3 (1996).  For a longer critique of the distinction 
as it applies to American constitutional doctrine, see David P. Currie, Positive and Nega-
tive Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986). 
8 See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 755-73 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (discussing the general theory and practice of substantive due process 
rights and providing examples of such rights). 
9 See Hall, supra note 3, at 45 (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized a 
liberty interest in rejecting care and that there might be a similar interest in obtaining 
it); Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 531-37 (tracing the freedom of health 
through Supreme Court and lower court cases); Hill, Tale of Two Doctrines, supra note 5, 
at 329-32 (defending the conclusion that “the Supreme Court has already recognized a 
substantive-due-process right to make medical treatment decisions without unwar-
ranted government interference”); Patterson, supra note 5, at 22-33 (cataloging and 
discussing Supreme Court precedents that support a freedom of health); Volokh, supra 
note 5, at 1824-28 (deriving a right of medical self-defense from the Supreme Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence). 
10 See infra subsection I.A.1. 
11 See infra subsection I.A.2. 
12 Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
13 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165-68 (2007) (affirming a statute ban-
ning certain abortion procedures even though they may be safer in some circums-
tances); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06 (holding that statutes criminalizing assisting sui-
cide do not violate the Fourteenth Amendement); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 
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There are, in fact, more Supreme Court evasions of the freedom of 
health than there are Supreme Court acknowledgements of it,14 and 
the freedom of health has rarely been used at all—and never been 
used alone—to invalidate state action. 
Importantly, though, the rarity of judicial invalidation does not 
prove that the freedom of health does not or cannot exist.  First, like 
all constitutional freedoms, the freedom of health may be implicitly 
protected in congressional decisionmaking.  Indeed, the difficulties in 
passing health care reform suggest that political constraints of a con-
stitutional dimension might be in play.  Second, like all constitutional 
freedoms, the freedom of health could not be absolute.  Even if given 
the highest level of constitutional protection—if designated a “fun-
damental liberty interest”—individuals’ freedom of health would be 
subject to a state-interest override.  In standard doctrinal terms, the 
individual right could be infringed if the restrictive legislation were 
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”15  If situated as 
a typical Fourteenth Amendment liberty, therefore, the constitutional 
freedom of health would prohibit the government from burdening 
autonomous health care decisions without a compelling reason, but it 
would not prohibit narrowly tailored public-health-justified or other-
state-interest-justified infringements.  So framed, this constitutional 
freedom seems already to exist, and the Supreme Court certainly 
could formalize it without deviating from precedent. 
This Article first draws out the freedom of health from Supreme 
Court precedent and demonstrates that, like other substantive consti-
tutional rights, the freedom of health is a negative liberty that must be 
balanced against legitimate and compelling regulatory projects.  The 
Article then applies that understanding of the freedom to evaluate 
some proposed and actual health care regulations that have made 
headline news in the last decade.  I consider the constitutionality of 
the phantom death panels, the H1N1 vaccine distribution program, 
 
497 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1990) (upholding a state’s ability to decline a parent’s request to 
withhold nutrition and hydration absent clear and convincing evidence of the incom-
petent’s wishes); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927) (upholding a state practice 
of requiring sterilization of the mentally ill); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 
(1905) (upholding a mandatory smallpox vaccination policy). 
14 See infra Part I (discussing numerous instances in which the Court found state 
interests compelling enough to override the freedom of health). 
15 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  But cf.  
Patterson, supra note 5, at 48-49 (suggesting that courts should use intermediate scru-
tiny, rather than strict scrutiny, to enforce the freedom of health and defining the re-
levant rubric).  
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the FDA’s restrictions on access to experimental drugs, PPACA’s obes-
ity and smoking regulations, and, of course, PPACA’s individual 
mandate.  Should those programs and regulations be constitutionally 
permissible under a Fourteenth Amendment freedom of health? 
My answer is that the freedom of health, if formalized in its cur-
rent form, would invalidate some but not all of the proposed interven-
tions.  “Death panels” (in the form that Governor Palin understood 
them to take16) would be prototypically unconstitutional under the 
new rubric (though incentives for doctors to gather and enforce ad-
vanced directives17—the would-have-been effect of the since-
abandoned provision that sparked the “death panels” debate—
certainly would not be).  The vaccine distribution program during the 
2009 H1N1 flu outbreak could have raised constitutional questions if 
the states had included criminal or high civil penalties for misdistribu-
tion of the vaccine, but in the absence of such penalties, the distribu-
tion guidelines did not offend the freedom of health.  Restrictions on 
access to experimental drugs should be constitutionally permissible 
because they promote a compelling state interest in gathering infor-
mation about the safety and efficacy of new drugs, but the current 
regulatory regime may not be sufficiently “narrowly tailored” to the 
state interest it seeks to promote.  Obesity regulations might be un-
constitutional, depending on their form, while most anti-smoking 
regulations should not be.  PPACA’s wellness initiatives do not raise 
serious constitutional problems. 
Perhaps most interestingly (and certainly most relevantly given 
present litigation18), the individual mandate would require a more 
 
16 See Sarah Palin, Statement on the Current Health Care Debate, FACEBOOK (Aug. 7, 
2009, 4:26 PM), http://www.facebook.com/note.php?not_id=113851103434 (claiming 
that the health reform bill would require “my parents or my baby with Down Syn-
drome . . . to stand in front of [President] Obama’s ‘death panel’ so his bureaucrats 
can decide, based on a subjective judgment of their ‘level of productivity in society,’ 
whether they are worthy of health care”). 
17 See America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. 
§ 1233 (authorizing Medicare coverage for “advance care planning consultation,” in-
cluding explanation of advance directives, such as living wills, durable powers of attor-
ney, and health care proxies); see also Toby Harnden, Obama Retreats on ‘End of Life’ 
Plans, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 15, 2009, at 5 (discussing the political demise 
of § 1233); Charles Hurt, Granny Lives!  ‘End of Life’ Out of Health Plan, N.Y. POST, Aug. 
14, 2009, at 10 (same); Clarence Page, Editorial, ‘Death Panels’ Myth Just Won’t Die, CHI. 
TRIB., Nov. 1, 2009, at 31 (same). 
18 Compare Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-
0091, 2011 WL 285683, at *33 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (holding that PPACA exceeded 
Congress’s authority under both the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper 
Clause), and Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 
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careful analysis under a freedom of health than scholars and courts 
have assumed.  That said, the state interest in enforcing the mandate 
seems sufficiently strong to support some infringement of individual 
liberty, and the actual law supporting the individual mandate imposes 
a negligible burden on the relevant liberty interest.  The individual 
mandate is a necessary element of health insurance regulation, assum-
ing that universal coverage is a reasonable goal; without a mandate, 
adverse selection will cause many individuals to be priced out of cov-
erage.  PPACA’s individual mandate seeks to correct adverse selection 
through an almost entirely rhetorical set of laws, which impose almost 
no actual burden on the constitutional liberty interest.  As written, no 
executive official has authority to enforce the mandate against non-
compliant individuals.  As such, the current “mandate” should pass 
the strict scrutiny test on the ground that it poses an infinitesimal 
burden to liberty.  If, however, Congress were to bolster the mandate 
with real enforcement power and heftier fines, the constitutional anal-
ysis under the freedom of health should, I think, become harder.19 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I fleshes out the freedom of 
health, identifying its foundations in existing American precedent and 
describing its differences from the “right to health” in international law.  
Part II considers the controversial proposals and enactments that have 
made news in recent health care reform debates, using analysis of those 
issues to develop the framework for enforcing a freedom of health.   
I.  THE FREEDOM OF HEALTH 
As a handful of scholars have pointed out, a constitutional free-
dom of health already exists at the margins of American law.20  In the 
forced treatment, reproductive rights, and right-to-die cases, the Su-
 
2010) (holding that PPACA exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause and Congress’s independent taxation power), with Mead v. Holder, No. 10-
0950, 2010 WL 611139, at *21 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011) (granting the government’s mo-
tion to dismiss a suit that argued against PPACA’s constitutionality and sought declara-
tory and injunctive relief), Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-0015, 2010 WL 
4860299, at *16 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010) (same), and Thomas More Law Ctr. v.  
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 895 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (same).  
19 This line of analysis does not, of course, speak to the mandate’s validity under 
the Commerce Clause or under various taxing provisions of the Constitution, which 
have been scholars’ and courts’ primary focus so far.  See, e.g., Steven J. Willis & Nakku 
Chung, Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare, 128 TAX NOTES 169, 178-93 (2010) 
(arguing that the penalty for failure to comply with the individual mandate is unconsti-
tutional under taxing provisions of the Constitution). 
20 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9. 
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preme Court has hinted that Americans hold an important—perhaps 
fundamental—liberty interest in directing their own health care, 
which at least includes a right to reject unwanted medical interven-
tions and might include a right to obtain desired medical treatment.  
Importantly, this constitutional right, like most American constitu-
tional rights, is a so-called “negative” rather than “positive” right.  That 
is, the Supreme Court has never indicated that the national or state 
governments are required to provide Americans with access to health 
care—only that they may not encumber that access without justifica-
tion.  This Part will briefly trace the freedom of health through Su-
preme Court precedent and then draw a rough sketch of the doctrine 
that emerges, distinguishing the “negative” American freedom of 
health from the “positive” international human right to health and al-
so offering a “participant-regulator” distinction to flesh out the “posi-
tive-negative” distinction between American and international rights. 
A.  The Freedom of Health in the Supreme Court 
In 2006, a panel of the D.C. Circuit held that terminally ill pa-
tients have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in accessing ex-
perimental drugs that might extend their lives.21  Further, the court 
held that the Food and Drug Administration’s prohibitions on the in-
terstate marketing and sale of those experimental drugs impermissibly 
burdened the patients’ liberty interest and were therefore unconstitu-
tional.22  Although later overturned en banc,23 the panel decision in 
Abigail Alliance sparked a flurry of scholarship on the question of 
whether there is or should be a constitutional right to health care.24 
Somewhat puzzlingly, much of this scholarship treats the public 
interest in regulating health as anathema to the individual freedom of 
health (and, vice versa, the individual freedom as anathema to the 
public interest in health regulation)—as though the two cannot coex-
ist in constitutional doctrine.25  The purpose of this Section is to dem-
 
21 See Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 
695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
22 Id. 
23 See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach  
(Abigail Alliance II), 495 F.3d 695, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding the “FDA’s policy of 
limiting access to investigational drugs [because it] is rationally related to the legiti-
mate state interest of protecting patients, including the terminally ill, from potentially 
unsafe drugs with unknown therapeutic effects”). 
24 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5. 
25 See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 5, at 1344 (“Individual rights seem inherently at 
odds with the collective, population-based perspective central to public health.”).  But 
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onstrate that these supposed strands of constitutional health law are 
actually one coherent doctrine—albeit an underdeveloped, nascent 
one in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  The public interest in regula-
tion—or, as one scholar puts it, the “public’s right to health”26—is 
simply a “state interest” that sometimes (but not always) overrides the 
individual liberty interest in health care autonomy, much as the state 
interests in regulating obscenity, fighting words, and elections some-
times override the individual freedom of speech.27 
In this Section, I will trace that single coherent doctrine through 
two strings of Supreme Court cases:  those that imply a freedom to re-
ject medical care and those that imply a freedom to obtain it. 
1.  Freedom to Reject Care 
a.  Origins 
The American freedom of health, as developed by the Supreme 
Court, got its somewhat inauspicious start in the 1905 case of Jacobson 
v. Massachusetts.28  Challenging a Cambridge Board of Health directive 
that all resident adults be vaccinated against smallpox, Henning Ja-
cobson argued that the underlying statute and its execution against 
him violated “the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own 
body and health in such way as to him seems best.”29  Often cited for 
the proposition that the individual freedom of health must not be a 
fundamental liberty interest,30 the unanimous opinion upheld the sta-
tutory scheme in the face of Jacobson’s challenge. 
But reading the Jacobson opinion as a whole and rehabilitating it to 
modern substantive due process analysis, its logic is fully consistent 
with a constitutional freedom of health.31  Writing for the Court, Jus-
 
see Patterson, supra note 5, at 47-49 (using intermediate scrutiny to balance individual 
and collective interests within a single constitutional doctrine). 
26 Leonard, supra note 5, at 1335. 
27 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (elections); Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) 
(fighting words). 
28 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
29 Id. at 26. 
30 See Hill, A Tale of Two Doctrines, supra note 5, at 296-99 (discussing the Court’s 
considerable deference to states’ “broad police power to act in the interest of public 
health and safety” at the expense of individual liberty); Leonard, supra note 5, at 1347 
(citing Jacobson for the proposition that “[t]here are . . . limits on liberty or bodily inte-
grity rights”).  
31 Elizabeth Patterson also reads Jacobson this way.  See Patterson, supra note 5, at 47 
(“The Jacobson Court gave substantial credence to the defendant’s claim that a manda-
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tice Harlan emphasized the “great dangers” of the smallpox epidem-
ic32 and found it important that the vaccine posed no unique health 
risk for Jacobson.33  He then specifically reserved the possibility that an 
individual with such unique risks could win an as-applied challenge if 
ordered to take the vaccine.34  In other words, the Court found that 
the state had a compelling interest in combating infectious disease 
and that Massachusetts’s forced vaccination law was narrowly tailored 
to serve that interest—particularly in its application to an individual 
with no unique risks and because it gave an expert, local board of 
health authority to determine when vaccination was necessary.  Hav-
ing so concluded, the Court did not need to decide whether Jacob-
son’s asserted liberty interest in health care autonomy was protectable, 
much less whether it was fundamental.35  That is, even if the freedom 
 
tory vaccination law effected a substantial invasion of his liberty; however, the Court 
found that liberty interest outweighed by the public interest in preventing the spread 
of contagious disease . . . .”).  
32 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29. 
33 See id. at 30 (noting that Jacobson’s objections to the vaccination were based on 
“the general theory of those of the medical profession who attach little or no value to 
vaccination as a means of preventing the spread of smallpox or who think that vaccina-
tion causes other diseases of the body,” rather than on any unique threat to his own 
life or health). 
34 See id. at 38-39 (noting that the Court’s holding should not be understood to 
apply in circumstances where vaccination would be “cruel or inhuman”).  At least one 
other scholar highlights this point in reading Jacobson as a freedom of health case.  See 
Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 535 (acknowledging the Jacobson Court’s sug-
gestion “that individuals have a right to protect their health against state-imposed 
harm from required vaccines”). 
35 In its most direct considerations of the asserted liberty interest, the Court gave 
conflicting signals as to the interest’s constitutional standing.  Justice Harlan asserted 
that “[e]ven liberty itself, the greatest of all rights,” needed to be balanced against the 
“safety, health, peace, good order and morals of the community,” thereby providing an 
analysis that resembles modern balancing of interests.  Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26-27 
(quoting Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)).  He also, however, con-
cluded with the following analysis:   
While this court should guard with firmness every right appertaining to life, 
liberty or property as secured to the individual by the Supreme Law of the 
Land, it is of the last importance that it should not invade the domain of local 
authority except when it is plainly necessary to do so in order to enforce that 
law. . . . [W]e do not perceive that this legislation has invaded any right se-
cured by the Federal Constitution.  
Id. at 38.  That last paragraph may mean only that the law survived constitutional scru-
tiny (because it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest) and there-
fore did not violate Jacobson’s constitutional rights, or it might mean that the legisla-
tion did not even implicate those constitutional rights.  Given the rest of the opinion 
and its careful balancing of state and individual interests, the former interpretation 
seems more compelling.  But the latter is certainly possible. 
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of health existed and garnered the highest level of constitutional pro-
tection, the Court found that the Massachusetts law was constitutional-
ly valid.  The Jacobson opinion, thus, certainly does not preclude—and 
its analytic mode of balancing individual and collective interests may 
support—a constitutional freedom of health. 
The next assertion of the freedom of health came twenty years lat-
er in the first of two forced-sterilization cases, Buck v. Bell.36  As it had 
in the Jacobson opinion, the Court rejected the constitutional chal-
lenge but did so in a way that is consistent with a modern freedom of 
health.  Carrie Buck brought a somewhat vague, or at least unspeci-
fied in the opinion, substantive due process challenge37 to a Virginia 
statute that authorized mental institutions to sterilize their patients.38  
Under the statute, an institution could require sterilization if there 
was evidence, adduced at a hearing with the patient present, that the 
underlying reason for the individual’s commitment was hereditary.  
Such evidence existed in Buck’s case.39 
For an eight-Justice majority,40 Justice Holmes wrote a characteris-
tically curt opinion that nevertheless balanced Ms. Buck’s individual 
interests in health and safety41 against the state’s interest in avoiding 
the social costs of institutionalizing persons with cognitive and mental 
disabilities.42  Although unpersuasive through a modern lens of repro-
ductive rights and mental health advocacy, the Court’s conclusion was 
 
36 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
37 See id. at 205 (“The case comes here upon the contention that the statute autho-
rizing the judgment is void under the Fourteenth Amendment as denying to the plain-
tiff in error due process of law and the equal protection of the laws.”); id. at 207 (“The 
attack is not upon the procedure but upon the substantive law.  It seems to be con-
tended that in no circumstances could such an order be justified.”). 
38 See id. (“An Act of Virginia . . . recites that the health of the patient and the wel-
fare of society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defec-
tives, under careful safeguard . . . .”). 
39 See id. (“Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman who . . . is the daughter of 
a feeble minded mother in the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate 
feeble minded child.”).  
40 Justice Butler dissented without writing a separate opinion.  See id. at 208. 
41 See id. at 205 (“[T]he sterilization may be effected in males by vasectomy and in 
females by salpingectomy, without serious pain or substantial danger to life . . . .”); id. 
at 207 (“Buck . . . may be sexually sterilized without detriment to her general health 
and that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
42 See id. at 207 (“We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call 
upon the best citizens for their lives.  It would be strange if it could not call upon those 
who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be 
such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.”). 
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that the state interest in avoiding public support costs for disabled in-
dividuals was sufficiently compelling and that the forced sterilization 
program, with its limited application to institutionalized patients with 
known hereditary conditions, was narrowly tailored enough to justify 
the intrusion on liberty.43  As in Jacobson, then, the Buck Court did not 
need to decide whether the asserted freedom of health deserved for-
mal constitutional recognition because the majority concluded that the 
sterilization regime would be constitutionally permissible in any event. 
Admittedly, the Jacobson and Buck opinions do not follow modern 
“strict scrutiny” or even “intermediate scrutiny” analysis, but neither 
are they as casual as “rational basis” review would allow.  Both cases 
give credit to the asserted liberty interest and take seriously the plain-
tiffs’ specific interests in health and autonomy.  That is, the opinions 
do not conclude that any rational reason for forcing vaccination or 
sterilization would suffice; rather, they conclude that the particular 
state interests implicated are sufficiently compelling to override the 
particular individual interests asserted.  In their analytic modes, there-
fore, they support a constitutional freedom of health. 
In the second of the two forced-sterilization cases, Skinner v. Okla-
homa,44 the Court invalidated a statute that permitted sexual steriliza-
tion of “habitual” criminals,45 but it did so on equal protection rather 
than substantive due process grounds, thereby leaving Buck v. Bell in-
tact.46  Nevertheless, the Skinner majority held that the assertion of an 
unequal classification—differential treatment of similar criminal cate-
gories—required “strict scrutiny” (the first use of that term in Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence) because it implicated “one of the 
basic civil rights of man,” namely “[m]arriage and procreation.”47  The 
Court emphasized the irreparable and uncertain effects of steriliza-
tion, noting that state-sponsored sterilization “can cause races or types 
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.”48  
This analysis is not a standard freedom-of-health analysis; the interest 
that the Court emphasized is not an interest in avoiding surgical inter-
vention or even in avoiding standard health consequences such as ill-
 
43 See id. (“In view of the general declarations of the legislature and the specific 
findings of the Court, obviously we cannot say as matter of law that the grounds [for 
sterilization] do not exist, and if they exist they justify the result.”). 
44 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
45 See id. at 536. 
46 See id. at 542 (distinguishing and thereby preserving Buck).  
47 Id. at 541. 
48 Id. 
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ness, pain, disfigurement, or death.  But Skinner’s acknowledgement 
of a right to marriage and procreation ultimately forms the found-
ation for the constitutional freedom to obtain medical treatment, 
which emerges from the reproductive rights cases.  It is therefore im-
portant to note the case here, even though the opinion is not a strong 
datum for the freedom to reject care. 
b.  Modern Cases 
The strongest data for that freedom, in fact, came nearly half a 
century after Skinner, in a pair of cases considering forced-treatment 
regimes.  In Washington v. Harper,49 the question before the Court was 
whether prisoners may refuse administration of antipsychotic medica-
tion,50 and in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,51 the 
question was whether a woman in a persistent vegetative state may 
demand withdrawal of her feeding tubes—and whether, given her in-
competence to make such a demand, her parents could do so on her 
behalf.52  The Court concluded in Harper53 and strongly implied in Cru-
zan54 that patients hold a constitutional liberty interest in rejecting the 
particular medical interventions at issue, but in both cases, the Court 
upheld the relevant regulatory regimes on state-interest grounds.55 
 
49 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
50 See id. at 213 (“The central question before us is whether a judicial hearing is 
required before the State may treat a mentally ill prisoner with antipsychotic drugs 
against his will.”). 
51 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
52 See id. at 280 (noting that the relevant question was whether it was constitutional 
for Missouri hospitals to have in place “a procedural safeguard to assure that the action 
of the surrogate” in “electing to have hydration and nutrition withdrawn in such a way 
as to cause death” represented “the wishes expressed by the patient while competent”). 
53 See Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22 (“We have no doubt that . . . respondent possesses 
a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic 
drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
54 In Cruzan, the Court acknowledged that “under the general holdings of [the 
Court’s] cases, the forced administration of life-sustaining medical treatment . . . would 
implicate a competent person’s liberty interest.”  497 U.S. at 279.  Without holding 
that such a liberty interest exists, however, the Court then decided, “for purposes of 
th[e] case,” to “assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent 
person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”  
Id. (emphasis added). 
55 See id. at 282 (“Missouri has permissibly sought to advance these [state] interests 
[in protecting incompetent patients’ lives and choices] through the adoption of a 
‘clear and convincing’ standard of proof.”); Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (“[G]iven the re-
quirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to 
treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against 
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In Harper, the recognition of the constitutional liberty interest 
seemed to be a slam dunk for all nine Justices.56  Although the majori-
ty and dissenting opinions disagreed as to the strength of that interest 
relative to the state’s interest in prison management, both opinions 
recognized Harper’s constitutional right to reject unwanted antipsy-
chotic medication.57  Cruzan then built on that explicit recognition to 
hold broadly that “a competent person has a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.”58  The 
Cruzan majority, however, was hesitant to extend the general right to 
cover even a competent patient’s decision to reject lifesaving treat-
ments, such as nutrition and hydration,59 much less a family’s decision 
to do so on behalf of an incompetent patient.60  In the end, the major-
ity did not decide whether the general right to reject care would cover 
such life-and-death decisions.61 
What emerges from Harper and Cruzan, then, is an explicit consti-
tutional freedom to reject medical interventions, at least so long as 
those interventions are not necessary to preserve life.  Admittedly, the 
Cruzan majority left open the possibility that the general liberty inter-
est is weaker or even nonexistent in the case of lifesaving nutrition 
and hydration, but the opinion nevertheless recognizes a general con-
stitutional freedom to reject care. 
 
his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the in-
mate’s medical interest.”).  
56 See Cruzan, 494 U.S. at 221-22 (finding for the six-Justice majority that Harper 
“possesse[d] a significant liberty interest”); id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority opinion for “undervalu[ing] respondent’s 
liberty interest”). 
57 For the dissent, the particular effects of antipsychotic medication enhanced 
Harper’s liberty interest in avoiding its administration.  See id. at 239-41 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the intended mind-altering ef-
fects of the medication, as well as its dangerous unintended side effects). 
58 497 U.S. at 278 (citing Harper as support for the recognition of this broad right).  
59 See id. at 279 (noting that “the dramatic consequences involved in refusal of 
such [lifesaving] treatment would inform the inquiry as to whether the deprivation of 
that interest is constitutionally permissible” and ending with a mere assumption, rather 
than conclusion, “that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person 
a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition”). 
60 The Court noted,  
The difficulty with petitioners’ claim is that in a sense it begs the question:  An 
incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to 
exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right.  Such a 
“right” must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate.  
Id. at 280. 
61 See id. at 279 (evaluating and upholding the enforcement regime on an assump-
tion, rather than a holding, that it implicated a constitutional right). 
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Neither Harper nor Cruzan, however, clarifies the constitutional 
stature of that freedom.  Although the dissenting opinions in both 
cases specify that the freedom ought to be a “fundamental” right that 
triggers strict scrutiny,62 the majority opinions do not offer a prede-
fined rubric—a precise level of scrutiny—for analyzing the govern-
mental intrusions.  Of course, the cases do make clear that the state 
interests asserted were sufficient to justify the regulatory regimes at is-
sue, but neither of the majority opinions explicitly labels those inter-
ests as “compelling” (for strict scrutiny), “important” (for interme-
diate scrutiny), or “rational” (for rational basis review).  The Supreme 
Court has thus certainly recognized that the constitutional freedom to 
reject medical care exists, but the freedom’s precise function is yet to 
be determined. 
2.  Freedom to Obtain Care 
Unlike the freedom to reject care, the freedom to obtain care 
does not yet have a life of its own in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  
Instead, its existence is implicit in and therefore tethered to the 
Court’s reproductive rights jurisprudence63—although, as I will discuss 
shortly, it also gained five nonprecedential votes in the assisted-suicide 
case.64  Despite its lack of formal recognition, the right to obtain care 
has a solid foundation in existing constitutional law, particularly given 
the difficulty of justifying some reproductive rights holdings without 
reference to the freedom of health. 
Specifically, the rights to contraception and abortion necessarily 
create a freedom to obtain at least certain kinds of medical care.  As 
the Court has recognized, these reproductive rights would be mean-
ingless without concomitant rights to access birth control mechanisms 
and abortion surgeries, both of which require physician intervention.65  
 
62 See id. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]f a competent person has a liberty 
interest to be free of unwanted medical treatment, . . . it must be fundamental.”);  
Harper, 494 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“There 
is no doubt . . . that a competent individual’s right to refuse [antipsychotic] medica-
tion is a fundamental liberty interest deserving the highest order of protection.”). 
63 See generally Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 530-49 (identifying the  
freedom-of-health components of abortion jurisprudence and urging reproductive 
rights advocates to emphasize that basis for preservation of the abortion right). 
64 See infra note 74 (discussing the concurring opinions in Washington v. Glucksberg, 
502 U.S. 702 (1997)). 
65 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156-58 (2007) (recognizing that reg-
ulation of abortion “would be unconstitutional ‘if its purpose or effect is to place a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains 
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Furthermore, the abortion right has a health care dimension insofar 
as a woman’s health or life might hang in the balance as she decides 
whether to terminate a pregnancy.66  Professor Jessie Hill has already 
traced both of these themes through the Supreme Court’s reproduc-
tive rights cases; she has demonstrated that Roe v. Wade67 and its prog-
eny68 rest at least in part on a constitutional right to obtain medical 
care and has highlighted the Supreme Court’s insistence—albeit 
somewhat less pronounced in the most recent partial birth abortion 
case69—that abortion restrictions not endanger maternal health.70  I 
will not reinvent that wheel here. 
But the right-to-die case, Washington v. Glucksberg,71 provides 
another important—and occasionally misunderstood72—datum for the 
existence of a constitutional freedom to obtain treatment.  In Glucks-
berg, three terminally ill patients and their physicians challenged crim-
inal prohibitions on assisted suicide, asserting that competent termi-
nally ill patients should be free to obtain a physician’s help in 
 
viability’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878-89 
(1992))); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687-89 (1977) (“Limiting the 
distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to licensed pharmacists clearly imposes 
a significant burden on the right of individuals to use contraceptives if they choose to 
do so.” (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 461-64 (1972))). 
66 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (observing that “[s]pecific and direct 
harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy” may result from denying access 
to abortions altogether); Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 531-32 (citing “the 
requirement that abortion regulations must contain an exception to protect against 
harm to a woman’s health” as an example of a “negative right to health”). 
67 410 U.S. 113. 
68 See, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124; Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 
546 U.S. 320 (2006); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Casey, 502 U.S. 833; 
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), over-
ruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City, Mo. v. Ash-
croft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 
416 (1983), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
69 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 155-56 (upholding a partial birth abortion regulation 
that lacked a health exception); Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 534 (noting 
the shift in the Supreme Court’s tone regarding the health exception in Gonzales). 
70 See Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 506-17 (describing the “medical 
model of abortion” that the Supreme Court seemed to follow in early abortion deci-
sions); id. at 534-37 (deriving a more general “negative right to health” from reproduc-
tive rights and other decisions). 
71 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
72 See, e.g., Hill, Reproductive Rights, supra note 5, at 536-37 (failing to note Glucks-
berg’s odd procedural posture and therefore casting the majority opinion as less sup-
portive of the freedom of health than is actually the case).  But see Robertson, Embryo 
Culture, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that five Justices in Glucksberg expressed support for a 
constitutional right to access palliative care, including death-hastening medical care). 
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hastening death.73  Because the three patients died before the case 
reached the Supreme Court, however, the Court treated the challenge 
as a facial assault on suicide bans—an assertion of a broad right to die 
for all humans, terminally ill or not.  So framed, the challenge did not 
get a single vote; the Court unanimously rejected the freedom to 
commit suicide. 
Five Justices, however, authored concurring opinions that indi-
cated their support for a narrower constitutional liberty interest in ob-
taining palliative care from a physician, even when that care might 
hasten death.  Justices O’Connor, Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer all wrote separately to indicate their support for—or at least 
their interest in preserving the possibility of—a constitutional liberty 
interest in access to pain management at the end of life and particu-
larly an interest in access to physician care in managing pain.  Indeed, 
for at least four of those Justices, that narrower freedom to obtain pal-
liative care seemed to trump the state’s interests in preserving life and 
avoiding euthanasia; for them it appears that the provision of even 
death-hastening palliation ought not to be criminalized.74  Because the 
challenged statutes did not in fact criminalize death-hastening pallia-
tion, all five concurring Justices supported the judgments of the 
 
73 See 521 U.S. at 707-08. 
74 Only Justice Souter wrote that the state’s interests should trump the asserted 
right to medical assistance.  However, he was considering a right to physician-assisted 
suicide, rather than a right to palliative care.  And, even considering the more contro-
versial suicide right, Justice Souter reserved the question of whether that right, if as-
serted as such (which it apparently was not), could “at some time[] be seen as ‘funda-
mental’ to the degree entitled to prevail.”  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 781-82 (Souter, J., 
concurring).  He wrote simply that a liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide was 
not sufficient to trump the state’s compelling interest in avoiding a slippery slope to 
euthanasia.  See id. (noting that the state’s interest in “protecting terminally ill patients 
from involuntary suicide and euthanasia, both voluntary and nonvoluntary,” was “dis-
positive for [him]” in addressing “the present claim that [Washington’s] law is arbi-
trary or purposeless”).  The other four Justices strongly implied that they would have 
voted differently if the state statutes had criminalized provision of death-hastening pal-
liative care.  See id. at 737-38 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that although patients 
may have a “constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief from . . . suffering,” 
the Court did not need to address that possibility in the context of the Glucksberg chal-
lenge); id. at 748-50 (Stevens, J., concurring) (writing separately to note that a ripe as-
applied challenge brought by still-living terminally ill patients might succeed); id. at 
789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (joining the logic of Justice O’Connor’s concurring opi-
nion); id. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that patients might have a fundamental 
right to avoid pain but that the statutes at issue in Glucksberg did not implicate that right). 
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Court, but they wrote separately to emphasize the importance of the 
asserted constitutional freedom to obtain health care at the end of life.75 
Of course, as with the freedom-to-reject-care cases, neither the re-
productive rights nor Glucksberg opinions—to the extent that they rest 
on or recognize a freedom to obtain care—could be read to support an 
absolute freedom.  The state interest in protecting fetal life has been an 
important constraint on women’s abortion rights throughout the Roe 
line of cases76—so strong, in fact, that it makes the Court’s scrutiny of 
abortion restrictions look more like intermediate than strict scrutiny.  
And the Glucksberg concurrences all recognize compelling state interests 
in preserving life and avoiding euthanasia.77  As with the freedom to re-
ject care, then, the freedom to obtain it must be balanced against regu-
latory interests, and that freedom (if it exists) certainly could be in-
fringed if the restriction were sufficiently justified and tailored. 
3.  Conclusion 
Throughout the Supreme Court’s constitutional health care juri-
sprudence, the Court has recognized the importance of asserted liber-
ty interests in health care autonomy.  As an aspect of general bodily 
autonomy, the freedom to reject care has gained formal recognition 
in a handful of cases, and as a necessary element of reproductive 
rights, the freedom to obtain treatment has been an important, 
though informal, player in several cases. 
Of course, like all American constitutional rights, the freedom of 
health is subject to limitation when it runs up against legitimate regula-
tory interests.  And, in contrast to core American freedoms like speech 
and religion, the Supreme Court has been quite willing to recognize 
state interests in health care regulation, often referring to preservation 
 
75 Id. at 777-82 (Souter, J., concurring) (grounding the right to physician assis-
tance at the end of life in the general right to bodily autonomy and concluding that 
“the importance of the individual interest here . . . cannot be gainsaid”).  
76 See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (“The 
very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclu-
sion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. . . . In our view, the undue 
burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the 
woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”).  
77 See generally Martha Minow, Which Question?  Which Lie?  Reflections on the Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide Cases, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (discussing the risk of abuse and coer-
cion that might arise if assisted suicide were permitted and concluding that the Su-
preme Court was right to focus on that risk even though the restrictive regime does not 
eliminate the practice of assisted suicide). 
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of health and life as core “police powers” of the states.78  In the end, 
then, the freedom of health seems to be an important constitutional 
freedom, but it is also one that requires balancing against many legiti-
mate—even compelling—regulatory projects. 
B.  The Freedom of Health Versus the Right to Health 
Before applying this freedom of health to current regulatory de-
bates, it is important to flesh out the distinction between the Ameri-
can freedom of health and the international human right to health.  
The primary difference between the two is that the American freedom 
restricts regulation while the international right requires participa-
tion.79  This difference entails two characteristics of substantive free-
doms in American law:  they are primarily negative rather than posi-
tive, and they focus primarily on regulation rather than participation. 
Much work has already been done on the positive-negative distinc-
tion, both in the health law literature and in the broader constitution-
al law literature,80 so I will summarize those arguments briefly.  I will 
then spend more time identifying and exploring the second (partici-
pant-regulator) distinction, which is important to individual substan-
tive rights generally and to the freedom of health particularly. 
I will first discuss the positive-negative and participant-regulator 
distinctions as they apply generally to the Constitution’s individual 
substantive rights, and I will then use those two distinctions to flesh 
out the difference between the American freedom of health and the 
international right to health. 
 
78 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905) (“The good and welfare of 
the [state], of which the legislature is primarily the judge, is the basis on which the po-
lice power rests . . . .”); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1873) (discussing 
the significance of broad police powers to “the life and health of the citizen”). 
79 International human rights are difficult to enforce, so I hesitate to embrace 
them as obligations.  See generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
80 See, e.g., Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health 
Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1331-37 (2010) (reviewing the arguments and literature 
on both sides of the assertion that the Constitution is a “charter of negative rights”). 
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1.  The Positive-Negative and Participant-Regulator Distinctions 
a.  Positive-Negative 
In asserting that the U.S. Constitution is a “charter of negative ra-
ther than positive liberties,”81 we typically mean that individual subs-
tantive rights limit governmental action rather than requiring it.  As 
Judge Richard Posner famously explained, “The men who wrote the 
Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little 
for the people but that it might do too much to them.”82  On this un-
derstanding, then, the difference between negative and positive rights 
is simply that negative rights are restrictions while positive rights are 
obligations.  A second, slightly more nuanced aspect of the positive-
negative distinction, occasionally identified in the literature, is that 
negative rights protect individuals against the government itself while 
positive rights oblige the government to protect individuals against 
outside influences, such as third-party aggression or natural or eco-
nomic conditions.83 
As many scholars have recognized, this distinction’s explanatory 
power for American constitutional rights is real but limited.  In at least 
three interrelated respects, constitutional rights create obligations for 
government action, and some of those are obligations to protect 
against outside influences.  First, many of the Constitution’s proce-
dural rights are positive under this framework, requiring the govern-
ment to provide (at taxpayer expense) grand juries,84 petit juries,85 tri-
als,86 information to arrestees,87 and assistance of counsel;88 requiring 
the government to obtain warrants before seizing property;89 and re-
quiring the government to compensate property owners when effect-
ing a taking.90  Although many of these rights protect individuals only 
against governmental attempts to deprive them of liberty or property 
 
81 Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). 
82 Id. 
83 See Currie, supra note 7, at 864 (noting that positive rights might obligate gov-
ernment “to protect people against hostile acts of third parties,” or even “to protect 
them from hunger and disease”). 
84 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
85 See id. amend. VI (protecting the right to a jury in criminal trials); id. amend. 
VII (protecting the right to a jury in civil trials at common law). 
86 Id. amend. VI. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. amend. IV. 
90 Id. amend. V. 
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and might therefore be enforcement elements of standard negative 
rights,91 some also protect against private third parties who are, for ex-
ample, pressing criminal charges or suing at common law.92  Further-
more, the requirement that the government provide these services at 
taxpayer expense rather than on a fee-for-service basis arguably pro-
tects the indigent against outside economic conditions, whether or 
not they are of the government’s making.  At least insofar as these 
procedural rights oblige governmental protection against outside in-
fluence, they seem to be purely positive under the standard positive-
negative rubric, and even those that are merely enforcement elements 
of negative rights constitute clear obligations for government action 
and are therefore positive in the broad sense. 
Second, the Constitution seems to require the government to en-
force negative rights in property, tort, and contract,93 thereby placing 
an affirmative obligation on the government to act as a creator and 
enforcer of the common law.  This constitutional requirement, if it is 
indeed a constitutional right, fails both tests for negative rights; it is an 
affirmative obligation for the government, and it is an obligation to 
protect against third-party deprivations rather than governmental 
ones.94 
Third and finally, as Judge Posner has recognized in his scholarly 
work,95 even the substantive rights that most clearly take a negative-
 
91 See Currie, supra note 7, at 886-87 (describing the governmental obligations that 
can arise from enforcement of negative rights). 
92 In the criminal context, the rights primarily protect individuals against govern-
mental deprivations of a negative right—either liberty itself in cases where conviction 
results in imprisonment or property in cases where conviction results in a fine.  As 
such, they may be viewed as corollaries to negative rights and also as consistent with 
the second aspect of the positive-negative distinction, the difference between protec-
tion from government and protection from outside influences.  But the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury in civil suits obligates the government to protect individuals 
from private third parties.  The Seventh Amendment, thus, seems to be a pure positive 
right according to the standard distinction. 
93 See, e.g., Bronzon v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 320 (1843) (“Any such modifica-
tion of a contract by subsequent legislation, against the consent of one of the parties, un-
questionably impairs its obligations, and is prohibited by the Constitution.”); cf. Ogden v. 
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 255 (1827) (“[A] State bankrupt law, which impairs 
the obligation of a contract, is unconstitutional in its application to such contract.”). 
94 See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic 
Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2005) (arguing that the creation and protection 
of private property and the market economy require active government assistance). 
95 See Posner, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that every negative liberty entails “a cor-
responding positive liberty” by requiring “a public machinery of rights protection and 
enforcement, a machinery that includes police, prosecutors, judges, and even publicly 
employed or subsidized lawyers”).  
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rights form—the freedoms of speech, religion, press, and assembly;96 
the rights to life, liberty, and property;97 and the protection of priva-
cy98—are all meaningless without a concomitant obligation for the 
government to enforce them.  Even the central “negative rights,” thus, 
give rise to affirmative obligations for governmental intervention, 
usually in the form of judicial invalidation of infringing legislative or 
executive action.99 
Nevertheless, there is something intuitively appealing and there-
fore persistently useful about the positive-negative distinction in 
American constitutional law.100  Certainly, the U.S. Constitution lacks 
the broad social and economic guarantees—quintessential “positive 
rights”—that appear in many other countries’ constitutions and in in-
ternational charters of rights.101  Unlike many international human 
rights, our substantive constitutional rights do not require the gov-
ernment to enable individuals to engage in constitutionally protected 
activities (speech, religion, etc.); they require only that the govern-
ment leave individuals free to engage in those activities.  The U.S. 
Constitution is therefore a “charter of negative rights” at least in rela-
tive terms, compared to international and foreign documents. 
b.  Participant-Regulator 
There is a second distinction, though, that seems to have great-
er—or at least additional—explanatory power for the set of rights that 
we choose to recognize and for the rights-enforcement scheme that 
we choose to apply in American constitutional law:  the participant-
regulator distinction.  This distinction arose in Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, with the Supreme Court holding that American 
 
96 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
97 See id. amend. V (forbidding the national government from depriving individu-
als of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); id. amend. XIV (forbid-
ding state governments from doing the same). 
98 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“Various guaran-
tees [in the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy.”). 
99 Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein have also discussed this point at length.  See 
generally STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS:  WHY LIBERTY 
DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999). 
100 See, e.g., supra note 6 (citing sources that discuss the positive-negative distinc-
tion in the context of medical decisionmaking). 
101 See generally Sunstein, supra note 94 (noting and attempting to explain the ab-
sence of social and economic guarantees in the Constitution). 
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states may discriminate against out-of-state citizens if they are acting as 
market participants but not if they are acting as market regulators.102 
The line between proprietary and regulatory action is thin,103 but 
the conceptual difference is relatively clear and descriptively useful:  
governmental provision or consumption of a good or service at public 
expense is a participatory action; creation of incentives for private 
provision of goods or services or for private consumption of goods or 
services is a regulatory action.104  Medicare and Medicaid, thus, are 
participatory actions (public provision of health insurance), while 
both the individual mandate105 and the health insurance subsidies106 
are regulatory actions (incentives for individuals to consume private 
 
102 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980) (“The basic distinc-
tion . . . between States as market participants and States as market regulators makes 
good sense and sound law . . . [because] the Commerce Clause responds principally to 
state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national mar-
ketplace.”); see also Norman R. Williams & Brannon P. Denning, The “New Protectionism” 
and the American Common Market, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247, 294-304 (2009) (discuss-
ing the role of the market-participant doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence with 
particular focus on a recent case, Department of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008)). 
103 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 541-42 
(1985) (“To say that the distinction between ‘governmental’ and ‘proprietary’ proved 
to be stable, however, would be something of an overstatement.”); Dan T. Coenen, The 
Impact of the Garcia Decision on the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 727, 733-34 (discussing arguments that the ruling in Garcia 
undermines the vitality of the Dormant Commerce Clause exception for state proprie-
tary functions); Treg A. Julander, State Resident Preference Statutes and the Market Partici-
pant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 541, 573 (2002) (ac-
knowledging that “as more levels of governmental action are added, and regulatory 
and proprietary powers are mixed,” courts could very well arrive at different conclu-
sions with respect to the same conduct (footnote omitted)). 
104 There is some debate as to where exactly tax exemption falls within this frame-
work.  In Department of Revenue v. Davis, for example, there was disagreement as to 
whether tax-exempt status for state municipal bonds (and not for similar out-of-state 
bonds) should be seen as solely participatory or as part regulatory, part participatory.  
See 553 U.S. at 345 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that market regulation is accepta-
ble when it goes “hand in hand” with participation); cf. Dan T. Coenen, The Supreme 
Court’s Municipal Bond Decision and the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1179, 1184-93 (2009) (arguing that Justice Souter mis-
takes this dual approach for an either/or designation). 
105 See PPACA § 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a) (West Supp. 1A 2010) (mandat-
ing minimum essential coverage).   
106 See generally PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1401–1421, 124 Stat. 119, 213-38 
(to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.) (providing tax 
credits for qualified health plans); see also THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUB. 
NO. 7962-02, EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM:  QUESTIONS ABOUT HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE SUBSIDIES (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7962-
02.pdf (explaining the details and eligibility criteria for the PPACA tax credits). 
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insurance).107  In general, regulatory actions use the government’s po-
lice power, while participatory ones use the power of the purse.108 
Of course, governmental participation in a market skews private 
activity within that market and therefore has incentive and regulatory 
effects.  The power of the purse cannot be wielded effectively without 
taxation, which is generally considered a regulatory action, and rules 
for distribution of and eligibility for publicly provided goods and ser-
vices are regulatory decisions that, if externally dictated, would influ-
ence the government’s willingness and ability to participate.  Fur-
thermore, the two actions might regularly be substitutes; many go-
vernmental goals can be achieved through either participation or 
regulation.  But the point remains that participatory and regulatory 
actions are conceptually (if not always practically) different. 
Furthermore, the distinction seems relevant to theories of consti-
tutional rights, and it helps to clarify the difference between the free-
dom of health and the right to health.  In general, our individual 
substantive rights focus on the government’s regulatory decisions, not 
its participatory decisions.  More specifically, American substantive 
rights tend to restrict regulation or, occasionally, require regulation; 
they almost never restrict or require participation.  Some examples 
follow, but bear in mind throughout that no American constitutional 
right is absolute and that “restrictions” or “constraints” on regulation 
are therefore different from “bars” or “prohibitions” on regulation: 
 The freedom of speech (broadly speaking and eschewing nuance) 
constrains the government’s ability to regulate what we say or how 
we say it,
109
 but it neither obligates the government to provide us 
with public forums nor constrains the government’s ability to pro-
 
107 This distinction provides a good example of where the distinction between 
proprietary and regulatory action becomes more formal than functional:  subsidies for 
private purchase of insurance are regulatory since they are incentives for private ac-
tion, but the line between subsidizing private insurance and providing Medicare bene-
fits is infinitesimally thin—particularly given that Medicare is largely administered by 
private contractors.   
108 Other examples include payment of unemployment benefits, which is a parti-
cipatory action (public provision of wages), compared to the minimum wage law, 
which is a regulatory action (incentives for private employers to use particular wage 
rates); and road construction and maintenance (public consumption of construction 
services), compared to speed limit laws (incentives for private behavior).   
109 See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978) (developing and evaluating three theories of the scope of 
speech protection under the First Amendment); Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of 
Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979) (analyzing why and to what extent free expression 
deserves governmental immunity). 
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vide such forums, nor does it obligate nor forbid the government 
from funding speech directly.
110
 
 The freedom of press (again broadly speaking) constrains the gov-
ernment’s ability to regulate media organizations,
111
 but it neither 
obligates the government to provide us with news nor constrains 
government’s ability to run public news broadcasts.
112
 
 The right to privacy restricts the government’s ability to regulate 
abortion procedures,
113
 but it neither requires the government to 
include abortion coverage in public health insurance nor prohibits 
it from doing so.
114
  Similarly, government is limited in regulating 
access to contraceptive devices115 but may choose whether to pro-
vide public insurance coverage for them; and government is limited 
 
110 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998) (re-
jecting a free speech challenge to the exclusion of a candidate from a debate on a pub-
lic broadcasting station).  See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum:  
Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 25-27 (discussing time, place, and manner re-
strictions on the freedom of speech); Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana:  Speech in Pub-
lic Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 236-56 (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence re-
garding the government’s ability to regulate public forums while still respecting the 
First Amendment).   
111 See Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (“The pub-
lishing business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given explicit 
constitutional protection.”).  Of course, regulations of broadcast media have been 
more tolerable.  See Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 990 (1989) (noting that, while licensing of newspapers is unconsti-
tutional, licensing of broadcasters is acceptable due to spectrum scarcity); Jonathan 
Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1101, 1106 (1993) (“Ordinary First 
Amendment philosophy strongly disfavors government licensing of speakers; the broad-
cast regulatory system, by contrast, embraces such licensing.” (footnote omitted)). 
112 See, e.g., Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. § 396 (2006) (establishing 
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and through it, the Public Broadcasting Ser-
vice and National Public Radio).  But see Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 
369, 400-01 (1969) (upholding the FCC “fairness doctrine” requiring that both sides of 
a controversy receive equal time on broadcast news). 
113 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing limitations upon abor-
tion restrictions when a mother’s life is at risk). 
114 In Maher v. Roe, the Court stated that  
[t]here is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected 
activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with leg-
islative policy.  Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to 
impose its will by force of law; the State’s power to encourage actions deemed 
to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.  
432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977) (footnote omitted); see also PPACA § 1303(1), 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18023 (West Supp. 1B 2010) (detailing abortion-funding rules). 
115 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (declaring a law that for-
bade use of contraceptives unconstitutional). 
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in regulating parental decisions
116
 but may choose whether or not to 
provide public goods or services to parents, such as public educa-
tion, child care, or even child protection.
117
 
For the most part, then, constitutional rights restrict regulation rather 
than participation.118 
There is an important caveat to the participant-regulator distinc-
tion, though.  Substantive constitutional limits apply even when the 
government is regulating only itself as a market participant—in other 
words, even when the government is merely setting rules for its own 
participatory programs.  This point is easiest to see in the context of 
the Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits discriminatory regula-
tions (such as discriminatory distribution and eligibility decisions) 
with respect to publicly provided goods and services.119 
But the point seems to apply broadly, beyond the textually speci-
fied equality requirement, to all constitutional constraints on regula-
tion.  For example, the Supreme Court invalidated, on free speech 
 
116 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (asserting that the 
government cannot “unreasonably interfere[] with the liberty of parents and guar-
dians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (striking down as unconstitutional a state prohi-
bition on teaching children a foreign language). 
117 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97 
(1989) (holding that the state’s failure to remove a child from an abusive father’s 
home did not violate the Due Process Clause because the Clause did not impose upon 
the state an affirmative duty to provide the child with adequate protection). 
118 Religious freedom, of course, is an exception to this rule.  The Establishment 
Clause restricts governmental participation in religious markets.  See Michael W. McCon-
nell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 117 (1992) (“The Estab-
lishment Clause . . . has been interpreted to forbid the government to aid or advance 
religion.”); see also Jesse H. Choper, Religion in the Public Schools:  A Proposed Constitution-
al Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 330 (1963) (arguing that public schools violate the 
Establishment Clause through “solely religious activity” that is likely to compromise or 
influence a student’s freedom of religious choice or belief).  But cf. Michael W. 
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 1409, 1414-16 (1990) (arguing that the Establishment Clause was meant to 
prevent Congress from interfering with state establishments of religion that existed at 
the time of the founding).  See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democ-
racy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195 (1992) (rebutting Michael McConnell’s interpretation of 
the Establishment Clause); Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 
701 (1986) (examining the seemingly inconsistent outcomes in Establishment Clause 
cases through the lens of the faded republican tradition). 
119 The most famous examples are restrictions on discriminatory admissions poli-
cies in publicly funded schools, including both segregation and affirmative action.  See, 
e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 
(1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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grounds, a ban on leafleting on public park grounds, roadways, and 
sidewalks—a regulatory action that applied only to public property.120  
Importantly, the Court did not hold that the First Amendment obli-
gated public provision of parks, roadways, and sidewalks for speech 
purposes but rather that the government could not prohibit speech 
on the public property that it already provided.  Similarly, it seems 
likely that the abortion right would come into play if the government 
stripped Medicaid eligibility from otherwise-eligible women on the 
ground that they had obtained privately funded abortions.121  The 
Constitution, thus, is not entirely hands-off with respect to government 
participation in markets.  Even when the government participates ra-
ther than regulates, its management decisions (unlike those of private 
participants) must abide by some substantive constitutional limits. 
Constitutional rights thus center on regulation rather than partic-
ipation, but they restrict regulatory actions even within participatory 
ones.  The relevance of the participant-regulator distinction, then, is 
that American individual rights neither require nor forbid participa-
tion itself, but they constrain regulation both within and beyond par-
ticipatory programs. 
2.  The Freedom of Health as a Restriction on Regulation and the 
Right to Health as a Requirement for Participation 
The “right to health” in international human rights law purports to 
require not just regulation but also participation.  According to the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the in-
ternational human right to health guarantees all individuals “the en-
joyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.”122  That right includes not only the freedom to reject or obtain 
medical treatment but also an entitlement to a healthy environment 
and to accessible treatment facilities.123  The right to health, thus, does 
 
120 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 169-74 (1939) (noting that the ban gave 
police authorities too much power to decide which citizens were allowed to dissemi-
nate information). 
121 See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1598-609 (6th ed. 
2009) (discussing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions). 
122 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see also OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., FACT SHEET NO. 31, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH  1 
(2008) [hereinafter OHCHR FACT SHEET], available at http://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/Publications/Factsheet31.pdf (highlighting the “right to health” as a 
“fundamental part of our human rights”). 
123 See OHCHR FACT SHEET, supra note 122, at 3-4. 
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not forbid excessive governmental involvement in private health care 
decisionmaking; it obligates the government to provide citizens with 
clean water, air, and streets and with hospitals, drugs, and doctors.124 
Admittedly, it is possible that a government could fulfill these ob-
ligations through mere regulation, offering incentives to expand pri-
vate markets in environmental quality and health care service.  But 
most advocates of the right to health seem to believe—and it is hard 
to imagine otherwise—that these obligations would require govern-
mental participation in the relevant markets.125  In particular, advo-
cates invoke the right to health when arguing for public health insur-
ance, public provision of hospitals and clinics, publicly funded 
treatment, public pharmaceutical research and development, public 
water and sewage system improvements, and so on.126 
The right to health, thus, is undoubtedly a positive right in its for-
mulation, requiring participation rather than just regulation at least in 
its invocation and also occasionally in its enforcement in foreign 
courts.127 
 
124 See id. at 22-28. 
125 See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Human Right to Health:  What Does 
This Mean for Our Nation and World?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1457, 1471 (2001) (“[I]f the inter-
national right to health is to mean anything at all, it does seem appropriate to impose 
some implementation obligations on states and also require affirmative action on the 
part of government . . . .”); Wendy K. Mariner, Law and Public Health:  Beyond Emergency 
Preparedness, 38 J. HEALTH L. 247, 272-75 (2005) (recognizing that the obligations to 
protect people from harm and to fulfill their health needs require affirmative govern-
ment action). 
126 See, e.g., Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 
31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 969 (2004) (“The right to water might also be placed as a sub-
ordinate right to that of the right to health . . . .”); Gary E. Jones, Regulatory Takings and 
Emergency Medical Treatment, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 145, 146 (2010) (analyzing the con-
flict between the right to health and our country’s fee-for-service health care system); 
Patti E. Phillips, Adding Insult to Injury:  The Lack of Medically-Appropriate Housing for the 
Homeless HIV-Ill, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 597-611 (1990–91) (extending the right to 
health to argue for the provision of housing for indigent people with HIV). 
127 See, e.g., Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC) at 728-29 (S. Afr.) (outlining the right to health in a case involving the antiviral 
drug Nevirapine); see also George J. Annas, The Right to Health and the Nevirapine Case in 
South Africa, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 750, 750-51 (2003) (using the Nevirapine case to 
explore the power of the right to health to obligate government provision of care); 
Mary Ann Torres, The Human Right to Health, National Courts, and Access to HIV/AIDS 
Treatment:  A Case Study from Venezuela, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 105, 111-14 (2002) (highlight-
ing the implications of a prominent Venezuela Supreme Court case on the government’s 
failure to provide antiviral therapies to treat HIV/AIDS); Alicia Ely Yamin, Not Just a Tra-
gedy:  Access to Medications as a Right Under International Law, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 325, 339-41 
(2003) (“Costa Rica, India, Venezuela, Columbia, Argentina, and South Africa are 
among the many countries in which national courts have determined that the state has 
obligations to provide medications in HIV/AIDS cases and for other diseases.”).   
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The freedom of health, by contrast, is a mostly negative right that on-
ly restricts regulation—and, of course, creates a concomitant obligation 
for enforcement.  Jacobson limits the government’s ability to regulate 
vaccine consumption but does not oblige the government to provide 
vaccinations—either through direct provision (i.e., participation) or 
through subsidization (i.e., regulation).  Buck and Skinner arguably limit 
the government’s ability to regulate fertility but do not oblige the gov-
ernment to provide sterilization or fertility treatment.  Harper and Cru-
zan limit the government’s ability to regulate consumption of medica-
tion and medical treatment but do not oblige the government to 
provide pharmaceuticals or health care.  The abortion cases limit the 
government’s ability to regulate the procedure but do not oblige it to 
include abortion coverage in public insurance or otherwise to provide 
publicly financed abortions.  And Glucksberg might limit the govern-
ment’s ability to regulate consumption of palliative care at the end of 
life but certainly does not oblige the government to provide that care.  
The freedom of health, thus, does not oblige governmental participa-
tion in health care markets. 
Of course, it does not forbid that participation either.  Several 
American governments (state and federal) do indeed provide publicly 
financed vaccines, reproductive technologies, pharmaceuticals, abor-
tion insurance, and hospice care.  And, of course, we provide many of 
our citizens with comprehensive public health insurance through 
Medicare, Medicaid, the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 
and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, or even with 
comprehensive public health care through the Military Health System.  
Public participation in health care is common and uncontroversially 
constitutional. 
C.  Conclusion:  The Freedom of Health 
Throughout a long line of precedent, the Supreme Court has taken 
seriously a principle of individual autonomy in health care decision-
making—a constitutional freedom of health.  That principle explicitly 
encompasses a freedom to reject unwanted medical care and implicitly 
encompasses a freedom to obtain at least certain kinds of medical care. 
Although it is true that the Court has never applied a naked free-
dom of health to invalidate governmental action, two features of subs-
tantive constitutional rights might explain the infrequency with which 
invalidation occurs.  First, all such constitutional liberty interests must 
be balanced against competing regulatory interests.  In the case of 
health care, especially public health, there are many such collective 
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interests that might outweigh individual autonomy.  Second, substan-
tive constitutional rights restrict only regulation, not participation, 
and the United States has largely relied on participatory rather than 
regulatory approaches to govern health care decisionmaking.  The 
rarity of invalidation in this case, thus, does not disprove or even 
much weaken the case for a constitutional freedom of health. 
II.  RECENT DEBATES 
Assuming, then, that a constitutional freedom of health exists, 
that the individual freedom must be balanced against compelling reg-
ulatory interests, and that the constitutional freedom cannot invali-
date participatory approaches to health care regulation, what implica-
tions does that constitutional rule have for recent hot-button issues in 
health care regulation?  How should we evaluate various autonomy-
restricting proposals and regulations, such as the phantom death pa-
nels, the 2009 H1N1 vaccine distribution program, the FDA’s restric-
tions on access to experimental drugs, PPACA’s antiobesity and anti-
smoking regulations, and, most relevantly, PPACA’s individual 
mandate?  This Part will address each of those issues in turn, with a 
hope of fleshing out a framework for the freedom of health. 
A.  Death Panels 
Throughout the congressional debates over national health care 
reform, Alaska Governor Sarah Palin and other conservative commen-
tators warned that the legislative proposals would create death panels, 
authorizing the government to determine whether sick and elderly pa-
tients should be allowed to get treatment.128  In her initial account, 
Governor Palin implied that the death panels would allow the govern-
ment to block access to all care, including privately funded care;129 only 
later did the conservative commentary refine the story to Medicare-only 
rationing.130  Although never actually proposed in Congress (or any-
 
128 See Palin, supra note 16. 
129 See id. (asserting that the health care law would require “my baby with Down 
Syndrome . . . to stand in front of Obama’s ‘death panel’ so his bureaucrats can de-
cide, based on a subjective judgment of their ‘level of productivity in society,’ whether 
they are worthy of health care”). 
130 See, e.g., Robert Longley, Health Care Reform and ‘Death Panels’—The Facts, 
ABOUT.COM, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/healthcare/a/deathpanels.htm (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2011) (“Across the Internet, blogs and e-mails are claiming that the 
America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009 (H.R. 3200) requires all Medicare 
beneficiaries to attend mandatory classes once every five years in which they will be in-
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where else), the initial account of the phantom death panels—public 
rationing of privately funded and privately provided care—is a useful 
starting point in considering the freedom of health and its operation.  
The kind of direct government rationing that Governor Palin feared is 
a prototypical example of what the freedom of health ought to forbid. 
According to Tea Party mythology, death panels would have au-
thorized the government, presumably through criminal prohibitions 
or other direct regulatory strategies, to pick and choose which indi-
viduals would be allowed access to scarce health care resources.131  To 
use Governor Palin’s example, the government would have been al-
lowed to decide that her child with Down Syndrome is unworthy of 
care and that the child should be allowed to die rather than be 
treated.132  Governor Palin thus imagined the death panels as a regula-
tory, not participatory, strategy to prevent the sick and the elderly from 
consuming our scarce health care resources.  In that form, death panels 
would have been a direct affront to individual autonomy and a severe 
constraint on the important liberty interest in health care decision-
making.  The imagined regulatory structure would have made it signif-
icantly harder, if not impossible, for some patients to access health 
care, even if the patients were willing to use their own money to pur-
chase it. 
Could such death panels be upheld as narrowly tailored regula-
tions that serve a compelling state interest?  I think not.  Although 
health care inflation is certainly a real problem that needs to be ad-
dressed and although we may spend more than we rationally should on 
care for the sick and the elderly, there are cost-control strategies that 
would infringe far less on the protected liberty interest than direct 
public rationing.  Furthermore, there is no definite answer on how 
much we should rationally spend on care for the sick and the elderly, 
so it is hard to claim conclusively that current spending levels are too 
high or that spending levels would be more appropriate if we rationed 
 
structed on how to end their lives.”); Domenico Montanaro, RNC Perpetuates  
“Death Panels” Rumor, MSNBC FIRST READ (Aug. 19, 2009, 2:27 PM), http:// 
firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2009/08/19/4430434-rnc-perpetuates-death-panels-
rumor (reporting on Republican National Committee Chairman Michael Steele’s ref-
erences to Medicare rationing); Sam Stein, Grassley Endorses “Death Panel” Rumor:  “You 
Have Every Right to Fear,” HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 12, 2009, 1:31 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/12/grassley-endorses-death-p_n_257677.html 
(quoting Iowa Senator Charles Grassley’s references to death panels, all of which fo-
cused on Medicare beneficiaries’ end-of-life decisions).  
131 See Palin, supra note 16. 
132 Id. 
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care through death panels.  That is, it is not clear that the savings 
gained from blocking some patients’ access to care would be worth the 
cost in lost years of life or in increased pain and suffering.  The mone-
tization of life years and of pain and suffering is inordinately difficult,133 
as is the determination of worthiness to consume care.  We therefore 
lack a precise measure or even a compelling sense of the cost-benefit 
trade, in the absence of which it would be hard for the government to 
demonstrate that the regulatory strategy was serving any state interest 
at all, much less that it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling one. 
What about the Tea Party’s revised sense of the death panels?  What 
if, instead of using a direct regulatory strategy like criminalization, Con-
gress amended the Medicare and Medicaid Acts to authorize the same 
kind of death panels for public health care coverage decisions, allowing 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to deny public insur-
ance coverage to those deemed unworthy?  Importantly, unlike Gover-
nor Palin’s initial conception of the death panels, this approach would 
leave individuals free to consume health care at their own expense, 
simply denying some individuals public funding for care.  In other 
words, the approach would be primarily a participatory one rather than 
a regulatory one.  As such, the freedom of health would not apply di-
rectly, but it should be incorporated into an equal protection analysis, 
justifying strict scrutiny of differential treatment among Medicare and 
Medicaid beneficiaries based on their health status.134 
In short, direct health care rationing would infringe individuals’ 
fundamental liberty interest in health care autonomy.  Because it is al-
most certainly not the least infringing approach to health care cost con-
trol, it ought to be unconstitutional under a freedom-of-health analysis.  
In their objections to the notion of death panels, thus, Sarah Palin and 
other members of the Tea Party movement were not completely off-
base.  Had the government ever proposed and passed such an ap-
proach, it would have been an unconstitutional extension of govern-
 
133 Value of a statistical life (VSL) approximations give us the best estimates for life 
years and pain and suffering, but those studies are widely divergent and tend to break 
down when the lives at issue are known rather than statistical.  See PETER A. UBEL, PRIC-
ING LIFE 3 (2000) (providing an anecdotal example of the failure of VSL analysis after 
introduction of a known life); W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical 
Life:  A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
5, 6-7 (2003) (noting that the variability of VSL approximations makes “match-
ing . . . values to the pertinent population at risk . . . problematic”). 
134 Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (referencing the liberty in-
terests in marriage and procreation as a justification for applying strict scrutiny to a 
sterilization law that discriminated among criminal categories). 
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mental power.  In their regulatory form, the imaginary death panels 
serve as a prototype for unconstitutional exercises of authority under 
the freedom of health, and even in a participatory incarnation, they 
should give rise to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 
B.  H1N1 Vaccine Distribution 
The 2009 H1N1 vaccine distribution program presents an interest-
ing case for the freedom of health.  In the face of a vaccine shortage 
and swine flu outbreak, federal and state governments set up a pro-
gram that effectively prevented some individuals from accessing the 
vaccine for a period of about two months.135  As such, the program 
hindered some individuals’ freedom to consume the vaccine, burden-
ing their liberty interest in health care autonomy.  Furthermore, the 
guidelines for vaccine distribution prioritized certain individuals over 
others based on risk factors such as age, health, and profession, rais-
ing a specter of direct rationing according to “worthiness.”136  Al-
though it is unclear whether anyone actually faced penalties for distri-
buting the vaccine against the guidelines, the states were authorized 
to require that only at-risk individuals be vaccinated in the first rounds 
of allocation, and at least three states provide for civil penalties for 
misdistribution of vaccines during a shortage.137  The vaccine distribu-
tion program thus operated somewhat similarly to the feared death 
panels, allowing the government to decide which people should get 
limited health care resources and perhaps blocking some people from 
consuming care that they wanted to purchase with their own money. 
 
135 See Questions & Answers:  Vaccine Against 2009 H1N1 Influenza Virus, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/H1N1flu/vaccination/public/ 
vaccination_qa_pub.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (explaining the CDC’s recom-
mendation that high-risk groups receive vaccines first); see also Betsy McKay, Public Faces 
Long Wait to Get New Flu Vaccine, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2009, at A1 (describing the alloca-
tion of the initially limited vaccine supply); Donald G. McNeil Jr., Vaccine Supply May 
Miss Swine Flu Peak, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, at A11 (expressing epidemiologists’ 
concern that vaccines would not be available soon enough to adequately protect the 
population). 
136 See 2009 H1N1 Vaccination Recommendations, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (Oct. 15, 2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/ 
acip.htm (listing vaccine distribution priorities). 
137 See, e.g., 2004 N.J. Laws 1545-46 (providing for a $500 civil penalty for willful or 
knowing violations of a 2004-05 influenza vaccine reallocation plan); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 433.040 (2009) (providing for a $500 civil penalty for violations of a health authority 
vaccination plan in cases of shortage); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-76-3 (Supp. 2008) (same).  See 
generally James G. Hodge, Jr. & Jessica P. O’Connell, The Legal Environment Underlying In-
fluenza Vaccine Allocation and Distribution Strategies, 12 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. PRACTICE 340 
(2006) (analyzing state responses to the 2004-05 flu vaccine shortage). 
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There are two important distinctions, though, between the H1N1 
program and the bald rationing of the fictional death panels.  First, 
the program was participatory rather than regulatory.  The Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had purchased the entire 
available supply of the vaccine and had distributed it back to providers 
and patients—at no additional cost—through state governments.138  In 
the vast majority of states, there was no law prohibiting individuals 
from buying the vaccine through a private supplier; there was simply 
no private supply available.139  Furthermore, the federal government’s 
distribution guidelines and similar guidelines in most states were 
purely informational and thus participatory;140 they were merely gov-
ernment speech.  In forty-seven states, there was no penalty for ignor-
ing those guidelines in either the distribution or the consumption of 
the vaccine.141  Second, even the restrictions that the three penalizing 
states imposed for misdistribution of the vaccine probably could have 
passed strict scrutiny.  The penalty was a $500 civil fine for each in-
stance of misdistribution,142 which would have imposed some burden 
on individuals’ liberty interest in accessing the vaccine but a lesser 
burden than criminal sanctions or heftier fines.  And in this case, that 
fine seems justified:  First, there was a known and discrete shortage in 
the vaccine supply.  Second, there were clearly identifiable factors that 
put some individuals at greater risk than others of catching the flu, 
such as working with small children, or at greater risk of being signifi-
cantly harmed by the flu, such as being pregnant.143  These two con-
crete factors—supply shortage and individual risk—contrast with the 
nebulous factors that would justify death panels—overall spending 
and individual worthiness.  There was therefore a concrete need in 
 
138 See generally State & Local Vaccination Guidance:  Vaccine Distribution Q&A, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 3, 2009, 4:00 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/ 
H1N1flu/vaccination/statelocal/centralized_distribution_qa.htm (outlining the vac-
cine distribution system to states). 
139 See Betsy McKay et al., Obama Targets Swine-Flu Response, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 
2009, at A3 (explaining federal government efforts to purchase and support produc-
tion of vaccine doses). 
140 See Benjamin E. Berkman, Incorporating Explicit Ethical Reasoning into Pandemic 
Influenza Policies, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 8-9 (2009) (“[P]roviders 
will . . . not be bound by the guidelines . . . and likely will feel pressured to give vaccine 
to . . . vaccine seekers who are not at elevated risk of infection or complication.”); Hodge 
& O’Connell, supra note 137, at 342 (noting that CDC guidelines are merely advisory). 
141 Cf. supra note 137 (noting the three states that did establish penalties for violat-
ing vaccine distribution guidelines). 
142 Id. 
143 See 2009 H1N1 Vaccination Recommendations, supra note 136. 
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2009 to steer the limited H1N1 vaccine resources toward certain pop-
ulations, at least until the supply could catch up to demand, to limit 
the public health consequences of the swine flu outbreak.  Although 
the distribution program effectively impeded some individuals’ free-
dom to obtain the H1N1 vaccine by socializing the vaccine supply, the 
CDC’s and the states’ participatory programs could have passed con-
stitutional muster. 
C.  Experimental Drugs 
Another interesting case for the freedom of health is the the sub-
ject of the Abigail Alliance opinions:  the Food and Drug Administra-
tion’s (FDA) restrictions on access to experimental drugs.  In Abigail 
Alliance, a group of patients claimed a fundamental liberty interest in 
accessing potentially lifesaving drugs.144  They wanted access only to so-
called post–Phase I drugs, which are drugs that have been deemed 
safe in the first phase of FDA clinical trials and will be tested for effec-
tiveness in Phase II trials.145  Under current law, drug companies may 
not advertise or market Phase II drugs at all, and they may sell such 
drugs only to patients who qualify for a “compassionate-use” exception 
from the FDA.146  Even then, drug companies may sell Phase II drugs 
only at cost, which is not enough to cover liability risks.  A patient’s 
best option for obtaining Phase II drugs, therefore, is to apply to be a 
subject in the clinical trial.147  But that option is far from a failsafe.  
The patient might not be accepted to participate if she does not make 
a good clinical subject for any reason, and even if accepted as a sub-
ject, the patient might be given a placebo instead of the active drug.  
Outside of the trials, patients may wait years for the drug to be ap-
proved and marketed.148 
The three-judge panel in Abigail Alliance found that these restric-
tions on access to Phase II drugs violated individuals’ liberty interest 
 
144 See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d 695, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
145 See id.  
146 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006) (requiring FDA approval before a drug may be in-
troduced or delivered for introduction into interstate commerce).   
147 See Jerry Menikoff, Beyond Abigail Alliance:  The Reality Behind the Right to Get Ex-
perimental Drugs, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045, 1057-58 (2008). 
148 See id. at 1051; cf. Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and 
the FDA New Drug Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 300 (2000) (not-
ing that FDA regulation may be creating a “drug lag” in the United States as compared 
to drug development in Europe). 
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in obtaining medical care.149  The D.C. Circuit, however, reheard the 
case en banc and overturned the panel’s decision, holding that no 
such constitutional liberty interest exists.150  Under a freedom-of-
health analysis, the panel was obviously right to recognize the liberty 
interest, though I would argue that the FDA restrictions serve a com-
pelling state interest and are therefore potentially valid. 
To establish that drugs provide effective treatment, we need to 
conduct clinical trials, and those clinical trials need to include control 
groups that receive placebos instead of active drugs.  A rational patient, 
however, would not choose to participate in a trial—and thereby to risk 
receiving a placebo—if she could instead access the drug on the mar-
ket, particularly where the drug has already been proven safe in Phase I 
trials.151  To preserve the public good of effectiveness studies, therefore, 
we have a compelling collective interest in restricting individuals’ access 
to Phase II drugs outside of the clinical trials. 
That said, the plaintiffs in Abigail Alliance could have argued that 
the restrictions are not narrowly tailored to serve the relevant interest.  
Many patients might apply for the clinical trial and be rejected for var-
ious reasons having nothing to do with the drug’s likely safety or effec-
tiveness.  For example, some patients might have other conditions 
that would be hard to control for in the study, regardless of whether 
those conditions were likely to affect the drug’s performance.  Under 
current FDA restrictions, even patients who applied to participate in 
the trials and were rejected are forbidden to access Phase II drugs on 
the market.152  The compassionate-use exceptions are administratively 
burdensome, making access difficult and risky for both patients and 
doctors.153  Given that the relevant state interest is to avoid free-
riding—to preserve an incentive for patients to volunteer for the tri-
als—there is no reason to forbid access to patients who were willing 
but not allowed to participate.  Once a patient has applied for the trial 
 
149 See Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
150 See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 712. 
151 See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Right to Experimental Treatment:  FDA New Drug Ap-
proval, Constitutional Rights, and the Public’s Health, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 269, 274 (2009). 
152 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006). 
153 See, e.g., Clarification of FDA Regulations and Guidance on “Compassionate” and 
“Humanitarian” Use, STANFORD U. RES. COMPLIANCE OFF. ( Jan. 2006), http:// 
humansubjects.stanford.edu/research/documents/compassionate_humanitarian_use_ 
FDA_GUI01036.pdf (explaining FDA regulations and guidance for the  
compassionate-use exception); UCSF Human Research Protection Program Guidelines  
on Emergency Use and Compassionate Use, U.C.S.F. HUM. RES. PROTECTION PROGRAM, 
http://www.research.ucsf.edu/chr/guide/chrEmerUse.asp#CU (last visited Mar. 15, 
2011) (same).    
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and been rejected, she should have a constitutional right to access 
Phase II drugs. 
D.  Obesity and Smoking Regulations 
Obesity and smoking regulations provide interesting foils for one 
another.  Under the proposed freedom-of-health analysis, I would  
argue that direct penalties for eating fatty foods should be unconstitu-
tional while the same direct penalties for smoking might not be.  That 
said, the participatory approaches that the government has used (such 
as Michelle Obama’s “Let’s Move” initiative154) and the nonrestrictive 
regulatory approaches included in PPACA (such as menu labeling re-
quirements155 and wellness initiatives156) should be constitutional with 
respect to both food and smoking. 
To start, I need to make the case that regulations targeting smok-
ing and eating impinge on the liberty interest in controlling one’s 
own health.  In doctrinal terms, the claim is that the freedom to reject 
care should include a freedom to reject preventive care such as diet, 
exercise, and smoking cessation.  In more colloquial terms, the claim 
is that we should be free to choose a shorter lifespan that includes  
donuts and cigarettes over a longer lifespan that includes only carrots 
and exercise.  That choice is ultimately a health care choice that falls 
under the ambit of the freedom of health.  As a result, any regulation 
that punishes people for smoking should raise constitutional questions, 
as should any regulation that punishes people for choosing fatty foods. 
Why, then, are obesity and smoking foils for one another if regula-
tions in both realms implicate the freedom of health?  The critical 
point here is that the collective interest in curbing smoking is much 
stronger and much more concrete—an interest among nonsmokers in 
avoiding deleterious effects of second-hand smoke—than the collec-
tive interest in curbing obesity.  This point, of course, is not new; the 
second-hand smoke justification for regulating cigarettes is well ac-
 
154 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Childhood Obesity Battle Is Taken Up by First Lady, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at A16 (discussing Michelle Obama’s program to “revamp” the 
way American children eat and exercise). 
155 See PPACA § 4205, 21 U.S.C.A. § 343(q)(5)(H) (West Supp. 1 2010) (requiring 
chain restaurants and retail food establishments to provide nutritional information for 
regularly offered food items). 
156 See id. § 4202, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300u-14 (West Supp. 1A 2010) (offering funding to 
states “to provide public health community interventions, screenings, and . . . clinical 
referrals for individuals who are between 55 and 64 years of age”); id. § 10408, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2802 note (West Supp. 1B 2010) (offering funding to employers for well-
ness programs that promote healthy lifestyles and disease self-management). 
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cepted, and others before me have noted that obesity imposes no simi-
lar negative externalities (except to the extent that we choose to sub-
sidize the health care costs of obesity through Medicare and Medica-
id).157  The effects of second hand smoke, thus, provide a compelling 
state interest for banning public smoking, though perhaps not for 
banning private smoking (in one’s home, for example).  The effects 
of obesity, by contrast, are mostly individual, such that the only state 
interest in banning unhealthy foods is a paternalistic one.  That pa-
ternalistic interest should not be cognizable where the relevant liberty 
interest is an individual freedom to make unhealthy choices free from 
governmental paternalism—which is what the right to reject care essen-
tially is.  If we have a genuine freedom of health, therefore, bans on 
consumption of unhealthy foods should be unconstitutional in a way 
that bans on smoking should not be.  A few modern regulations might 
be unconstitutional under this analysis, including bans on trans fats158 
and so-called “fat taxes.”159 
That said, the freedom of health ought not to forbid the govern-
ment from requiring smokers or obese individuals to pay more for 
Medicare and Medicaid coverage than nonsmokers and nonobese in-
dividuals.  Such a system would not penalize the choice to be unheal-
thy; it would simply require unhealthy individuals to pay for the con-
sequences of their choices or to forego care for their lung cancer or 
diabetes.  Such a system would be no different from requiring people 
to pay damages for defamation; they are free to speak but must pay for 
the damage they cause by speaking. 
Furthermore, informational campaigns, labeling requirements, 
and private wellness initiatives should present no constitutional prob-
lem under a freedom-of-health analysis.  Informational campaigns are 
merely government speech, participatory actions that individuals re-
main free to ignore.  Labeling requirements are regulatory because 
they require manufacturers to engage in particular behaviors, but 
their effect on health care choices is no greater than that of public in-
formational campaigns; they leave individual consumers free to ignore 
the labels and to continue smoking and eating.  Purely informational 
 
157 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Taxing Obesity—Or Perhaps the Opposite, 53 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 575, 582 (2005–06). 
158 See, e.g., Phila., Pa., Health Code § 6-307 (2011) (prohibiting trans fats in food 
served at restaurants).  
159 See Jeff Strnard, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”:  The Role of Food Taxes in Developed 
Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1226 (2005) (discussing food taxes that “explicitly 
attempt to influence behavior to meet public health goals”). 
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strategies, thus, should face no constitutional problem.  The wellness 
initiatives are trickier because they effectively punish unhealthy choic-
es by denying benefits to people who refuse to participate in wellness 
programs.160  But all such programs currently in existence are privately 
provided and regulated only to prevent excessive discrimination on 
the basis of health status.  Therefore, under the state action doctrine, 
these programs are constitutional. 
E.  The Individual Mandate 
The most notable controversy regarding the constitutionality of 
health care regulation today is the debate over the individual 
mandate.  The substantive due process challenge that I consider here, 
however, has not been a prominent one in that debate.  Instead, most 
scholars and lawyers have focused on structural questions, particularly 
whether Congress has authority to require individual insurance cover-
age under either its power to tax or its power to regulate interstate 
commerce.161  Indeed, even those scholars who argue that the mandate 
is unconstitutional because it infringes individual liberty do not rely 
on substantive due process—much less on a freedom of health—to 
support their claims.162  Of course, their hesitation is understandable; 
the claim that we have a substantive due process right not to buy 
health insurance sounds like a Lochner -style claim.163 
Under a freedom of health, though, the substantive due process 
analysis seems more plausible than most scholars have made it out to 
be.  The mandate requires individuals to carry health insurance cov-
 
160 See Cynthia A. Baker, Bottom Lines and Waist Lines:  State Governments Weigh In on 
Wellness, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 185, 189 (2008) (“[T]o the extent government sup-
ported wellness initiatives ostracize, isolate, and punish . . . unhealthy individuals, 
those initiatives should be doubly criticized . . . .”); Thomas J. Parisi, The Onus Is on 
You:  Wellness Plans and Other Strategies Being Employed for Patients to Take Ownership of 
Their Health, 13 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 243, 268-69 (2010) (discussing methods by 
which employers use wellness programs to penalize nonparticipants). 
161 See, e.g., Randy Barnett et al., Why the Personal Mandate to Buy Health Insurance Is 
Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, LEGAL MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found., Washing-
ton, D.C.), Dec. 9, 2009, at  1-2 (arguing that the individual mandate exceeds Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause). 
162 See Hall, supra note 3, at 41 (discussing possible constitutional challenges to the 
individual mandate based upon religious freedom, due process, and the Takings 
Clause); James Taranto, Op-Ed., ‘A Commandeering of the People,’ WALL ST. J., July 24–25, 
2010, at A11 (suggesting an argument against the individual mandate premised upon 
the Tenth Amendment’s preservation of power to the people). 
163 See Hall, supra note 3, at 45 (rejecting the possibility of a substantive due process 
claim against PPACA because “there is no fundamental right to be uninsured”). 
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erage throughout the tax year or pay a penalty.164  At first blush, this 
requirement does not impinge at all on an individual’s freedom either 
to refuse or to obtain health care.  It prohibits individuals from refus-
ing health insurance, not any particular health care, and individuals 
with insurance coverage remain free to consume any care they choose.  
Indeed, insurance might enable individuals to consume some care 
that they otherwise would not be able to afford, thereby expanding 
individuals’ freedom to make health care choices. 
But today’s insurance contracts are not mere risk pools, gathering 
and distributing funds for health care consumption at the discretion 
of the insured.  Instead, today’s contracts give insurers variable 
amounts of discretion under “medical necessity” review to decide 
whether their insured can buy various kinds of health care with the 
pool’s money.165  That is, insurance companies today use their con-
tracts to steer individuals towards certain health care consumption de-
cisions, often refusing to cover treatments that they deem ineffective, 
unnecessary, or even just inordinately costly.  As such, an individual’s 
choice among different kinds of insurance contracts—or her choice 
to enter no such contract at all—will impact her health care consump-
tion.  If she is required to buy into such a contract, a patient will give 
up some degree of freedom and autonomy to choose her own care; at 
a minimum, she will lose some freedom to direct the care that she 
purchases with the dollars that she has set aside in insurance.  Fur-
thermore, PPACA outlaws the most freedom-preserving kinds of  
insurance (such as high-deductible sickness and accident insurance), 
requiring all insurance contracts to provide extensive benefits.166  
Those requirements mean that most health care will be covered, but 
they also mean that the insurance companies will be allowed to review 
most consumption decisions for medical necessity. 
 
164 See PPACA §§ 1501, 16106, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West Supp. 1A 2010) (setting 
the penalty scheme for failure to maintain minimal essential coverage); see also STAFF 
OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE 
PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION 
WITH THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT” 31-34 (Comm. Print 
2010), available at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3673 
(providing information on the present law and the penalties that PPACA will impose). 
165 See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Ne-
cessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1640-41, 1672-73 (1992) (describing the discretion pro-
vided insurers to conduct “medical necessity” review in health care contracts). 
166 See PPACA § 1302, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (West Supp. 1B 2010) (setting forth 
minimal health benefits that qualified health plans must cover). 
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Of course, even the most restrictive insurance contracts leave their 
beneficiaries free to pay out of pocket for care that the insurance 
companies will not cover.  The requirement to carry insurance, thus, 
does not fully strip individuals of the freedom to make alternative 
consumption decisions.  As a result, it is possible to argue that the 
negative liberty interest is intact; individuals remain free to obtain 
whatever care they can afford, just as they would be without an insur-
ance contract.  But standard constitutional analysis is not usually satis-
fied with that kind of marginal, retained freedom if a regulatory re-
gime burdens the protected freedom’s exercise in a meaningful way.  
In speech, for example, a regulatory regime that has the real-world ef-
fect of chilling speech will be unconstitutional even if the regulation 
does not fully negate the freedom to speak.167  Similarly, an abortion 
regulation might be unconstitutional if it has the real-world effect of 
making abortion a harder choice, even if women retain the freedom 
to choose an abortion in the face of the regulatory regime; that real-
world effect is the crux of the “undue burden” analysis.168  In this case, 
requiring individuals to enter insurance contracts and thereby autho-
rizing insurance companies to perform “medical necessity” review 
places at least some burden on individuals’ freedom to choose their 
own health care.  It will have the real-world effect of swaying health 
care choices.169 
There seems, therefore, to be a colorable claim that the mandate 
infringes the freedom of health by requiring individuals to enter  
discretion-limiting insurance contracts—requiring individuals to give 
a third-party insurer the power to influence or even to direct their 
health care spending.  The argument is not a bald, Lochner -era claim 
of freedom of contract; it is a claim that these particular contracts 
make it harder for individuals to exercise an independently protected 
liberty interest in health care decisionmaking.  For an analogy, im-
agine that some Internet service providers were contractually autho-
 
167 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (invalidating a regula-
tion that required recipients of mail to authorize deliveries of “communist political prop-
aganda” on the ground that it would have a chilling effect on communist expression). 
168 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937-38 (2000) (applying the “undue bur-
den” standard to invalidate prohibitions on so-called “partial-birth abortions”); Akron 
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452-53 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (articulating the undue burden standard), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood 
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
169 See, e.g., Aetna v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 201-02 (2004) (recounting the stories of 
two plaintiffs who made health care consumption decisions in accordance with their 
insurance companies’ determinations of medical necessity rather than purchasing al-
ternative care out of pocket). 
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rized to monitor our Internet usage and to block our access to sites 
that they deemed unnecessary or inappropriate (for example, if they 
saw that we spent too much time on Facebook during work hours), 
and imagine that the government required us to buy Internet access 
through such a contract.  I imagine that the freedom of speech would 
come into play there—at least as a colorable argument, if not as a suc-
cessful tool—even though the regulation would center on a contract 
and even if we were free to access the blocked content through other 
channels, through other media, or through out-of-pocket payment.  
The freedom-of-health argument against the mandate thus seems co-
lorable and difficult—certainly more viable, I think, than a mere ref-
erence to Lochner would lead us to believe. 
Ultimately, however, even if the freedom of health presents a co-
lorable limitation for the individual mandate, the law as currently writ-
ten should pass muster under the balancing test.  Expanding health 
insurance coverage and decreasing the cost of insurance on the indi-
vidual market should count as compelling state interests, but we can 
neither expand coverage nor control individual market costs as long 
as insurers fear adverse selection.  That is, insurance companies will 
continue to raise prices on the individual market and will continue to 
deny coverage as long as they worry that the people seeking insurance 
are more likely than average to be sick.  The mandate addresses that 
problem by requiring that everyone, sick and healthy alike, enter the 
insurance pool. 
Furthermore, there can be no doubt that the mandate is narrowly 
tailored.  Indeed, it is perhaps too narrowly tailored.  The mandate 
claims that it imposes a penalty (or a fine or a tax) of $695 per year170 
or 2.5% of taxable income (whichever is greater)171 for any individual 
who refuses to buy insurance.  The cost of an individual insurance 
contract, though, is more than $695 per year.172  Many Americans 
 
170  Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1602(a)(2), 26 
U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(3) (West Supp. 1A 2010).  
171 PPACA § 10106(b)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(2).   
172 See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Obama Plan to Be Costly for Some Uninsured, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS, July 1, 2010, at B5 (acknowledging that new health coverage for previously 
uninsured individuals may have premiums as high as $900); Janet Trautwein, Op-Ed., 
Why We Need a Strong Individual Mandate, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2009, at A19 (pointing 
out that as long as the penalty for failing to purchase insurance is not comparable to 
the cost of coverage, Americans will continue to avoid procuring insurance). 
 Median household income in the United States is about $40,000 per year.  See Ta-
ble of Personal Income for People 25 Years Old and Over with Work Experience in 
2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032010/ 
perinc/new03_010.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).  The exemption is $3650, see I.R.S. 
MONCRIEFF_PRINT.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2011  4:27 PM 
2011] The Freedom of Health 2251 
might therefore rationally choose to pay the penalty rather than carry 
insurance, leaving them free to direct their own health care consump-
tion.  Furthermore, the penalty itself is extremely difficult for the gov-
ernment to enforce.  PPACA did not give the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice any power to assess the tax or to collect the fine or penalty except 
by deducting from future income tax refunds.173  Individuals thus re-
main free to ignore the penalty so long as they never pay more tax 
than they owe, allowing them to remain uninsured without penalty.  
In short, the law of the individual mandate barely infringes liberty; it 
seems to be a mere rhetorical or expressive attempt to convince indi-
viduals to buy insurance rather than an actual exercise of police power 
to require universal coverage. 
In the end, then, the individual mandate might present a harder 
case under substantive due process than most commentators have as-
sumed and might present an increasingly difficult case if Congress ev-
er gives the mandate teeth.  As written, however, the law ought to pass 
muster under the state-interest override given that it is minimally in-
fringing. 
CONCLUSION 
The individual freedom of health has lurked in Supreme Court 
precedent for several decades, but it has not emerged with a life of its 
own.  Its spectral existence may be due in part to our recognition of 
many legitimate regulatory interests in health care and public health.  
Ultimately, however, those regulatory interests can and should be ba-
lanced against the individual liberty interest within the constitutional 
doctrine.  We ought, therefore, to recognize the freedom of health 
and to apply it with a standard state-interest-override potential, 
through strict or intermediate scrutiny. 
 
Form 1040A, at l. 26 (2010), making median taxable income $36,350 ($40,000 - $3650).  
Two and one-half percent of that is $908.75.  Using the $900 estimate for insurance 
premiums, that leaves most taxpayers’ penalty smaller than the cost of insurance (most 
being defined as everyone below the median).  And, of course, the average cost of indi-
vidual coverage today is significantly higher than $900 per year; the $900 figure is a ge-
nerous estimate of how much costs will go down once the exchanges and regulations 
are in place. 
173 See J. Paul Singleton, Can You Really Have Too Much of a Good Thing?:  How Bene-
volent Tax Policies Have Attributed to the Explosion of Health Care Costs and How New Policies 
Threaten to Do More of the Same, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 305, 326-28 (2010) (explain-
ing how the IRS’s inability to enforce the penalty through use of liens or seizers will 
decrease the individual mandate’s effectiveness). 
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If we apply that formula to recent hot-button issues in health care 
regulation, most of what the government has actually accomplished 
should pass constitutional muster.  Both our national and state gov-
ernments have primarily focused on participatory approaches to 
health care, and even the regulatory exercises address compelling 
state interests and present minimal infringements of individual liberty.  
That said, the restrictions on access to Phase II experimental drugs, the 
ban on trans fats, and the “fat taxes” on sugary and fatty foods present 
constitutional problems, and the individual mandate presents a harder 
case under a freedom of health than most scholars have recognized. 
 
